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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we will examine the role of embeddedness and social capital in the process of 
cohesive subgroup formation in strategic technology alliance networks. More in particular, 
we will investigate the social mechanisms that enable and enforce cohesive subgroup 
formation. We will argue that the enabling effects of social capital in the beginning of the 
group formation process can turn into paralyzing effects as the block formation process 
progresses. Through the formation of subsequent ties, firms in social systems tend to rely 
heavily on their direct and indirect contacts in forming new partnerships. This so-called 
“local search” enables firms to create trustworthy and preferential relations. Over time, 
those relations tend to develop into strong ties, as firms rely on the same partners by 
replicating their existing ties. This enabling effect of social capital at the group level can, 
however, turn into a paralyzing effect as actors become locked-in, as they only rely on 
partners in their closed social system. Then searching for or switching to partners outside of 
the cohesive subgroup is hard to rationalize, in particular when trustworthy partners are 
already available in this system. The firms in cohesive subgroups tend to become more 
similar over time as a result of contagion and replication of their existing ties. This so-called 
phenomenon of overembeddedness induced by the paralyzing effects of social capital at the 
group level can lead to decreasing opportunities for learning and innovation for 
blockmembers involved.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the academic literature on strategic alliances interdependence and complementarity 
have been addressed as the most common explanation why firms form inter-
organisational ties (Richardson, 1972; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Nohria and Garcia-
Pont, 1991). This stream of research made progress in examining the factors 
determining the propensity of firms to form alliances, i.e. the exogenous dynamics. 
The decision whom those firms should tie themselves to is less clear (Gulati, 
Gargiulo, 1999). This so-called endogenous dynamic refers to building preferential 
relationships, which are characterized by trust, stability and rich exchange of 
information between partners (Dore, 1983; Powell, 1990; Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999). 
Some academic attention has focused on the role of social structural context as an 
important driving factor in the alliance formation process (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Walker, 
Kogut, Shan, 1997; Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999; Chung, Singh, Lee, 2000). This social 
structural context refers to embeddedness as well as to social capital influencing the 
decision with whom to tie up.    3
Embeddedness implies that the partners’ actions influence the behavior and relations 
of firms in the network (Granovetter, 1992; Gulati, 1998). Embeddedness influences 
the firms’ tying behavior, because it enables preferential relations to emerge from the 
direct and indirect contacts firms have built up in their past partnerships. Preferential 
relations tend to reduce search costs and tend to ease the risk of opportunistic 
behavior between the partners involved (Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999). Thus, as this process 
of finding the right partners with complementary resource configurations is costly and 
time-consuming, firms tend to engage in local search for forming their subsequent 
ties, based on the social capital (Burt, 1992) that firms have built up in their past 
partnerships.  
 
Social capital refers to the shared values, norms and trust between alliance partners 
and is thus by its very nature dependent on history (Chung, Sing, Lee, 2000). It 
enables firms to rely on both direct and indirect alliance-experiences in partner 
selection (Chung, Singh, Lee, 2000) and hence to shortcut the partner-selection 
process. Moreover, the current relations of firms stem from its prior relational 
activities and form the basis upon which the actor establishes future social relations 
(Gulati, 1998; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Chung, Sing, and Lee, 2000). Social 
capital manifests itself as a specific social context, where social ties, trusting relations, 
and value systems facilitate behavior, if located within that context (Tsai and Ghosal, 
1998). These different aspects of social context are labeled the structural, the 
relational, and the cognitive dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998; Tsai and Ghosal, 1998).  
 
Through preferential partnering, firms become embedded in densily connected 
networks of relations. These closely connected parts of the network provide a strong 
basis of trust and intimacy for the companies involved (see Krackhardt, 1992; Brass, 
Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998; Granovetter, 1973) and hence provides the basis for 
further reproduction of this collective asset. 
 
However, apart from this network enabling effect of social capital (see figure 1), the 
academic literature has given considerably less attention to the constraining effects of 
social capital in the decision with whom to partner. In many cases, the enabling effect 
of social capital in alliance formation that is based on preferential relations can turn   4
into a paralyzing effect as actors become locked-in, as they only rely on partners in 
their own closed social system. Then, over time those firms may start to suffer from 
“over-embeddedness” (Uzzi, 1997) in technological terms as well as in relational 
terms. The latter refers to “relational inertia” (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 
2000). This phenomenon, also known as strategic gridlock (Gomez-Casseres, 1996) 
forces firms to exclude attractive partners and therefore is likely to put a severe strain 
on their ability to move 
flexible into other 
“resource niches” or into 
new windows of 
opportunities. This is 
what we refer to as the 
constraining or 
paralyzing effect of 
social capital.  
 
In this paper we will investigate the main social mechanisms that create enabling 
effects of social capital and drive cohesive subgroup formation. Additionally, we will 
examine the social mechanisms that result in paralyzing effects of social capital and 
enforce cohesive subgroup formation.  We expect that the enabling effects of social 
capital in the beginning of the group formation process can turn into paralyzing 
effects as the block formation process progresses. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  AND PROPOSITIONS 
Social capital relates to the investment in social relations that generates expected 
returns (Lin, 1999). It is defined as “the sum of resources that accrue to a firm by 
virtue of possessing a durable network of relationships” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 119; Koka and Prescott, 2002). Thus, social capital refers to the network of 
relations as well as the resources embedded in that network that may be accessed and 
mobilized in purposive actions (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghosal, 
1998; Lin, 1999). In the literature we find consensus that investing in social relations 
and accessing and using the resources embedded in social networks, results in gaining 
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Figure 1 Enabling and constraining effects of social capital   5
 
Although most literature on social capital has taken on a focal firm perspective in 
describing the full dynamics of group formation in social networks, the effect of 
social capital at the group level also has to be taken into account. Social capital at the 
group level refers to aggregation of individual returns that benefits the collective (Lin, 
1999). Most of the literature on this subject focuses on how certain groups develop 
and maintain their social capital as a collective asset and how such a collective asset 
enhances group members’ life chances (Bourdieu, 1983,1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; 
Putnam, 1993; Lin, 1999). Through dense or closed networks collective social capital 
can be maintained and reproduction of the group can be achieved. Norms and trust 
play an important role in producing and maintaining the collective asset (Lin, 1999). 
Then, being part of a dense, cohesive and redundant network promotes a normative 
environment that involves trust and cooperation among its members (Coleman, 1988, 
1990; Gargiulo, Benassi, 2000) and eventually leads to a situation of strong social 
cohesion within these subgroups in the network (Burt, 1984; Collins, 1988; Friedkin, 
1984).  Cohesion refers to the extent of relative direct interaction among individuals 
in a social system, requiring only few intermediaries, e.g. indirect links (Bovasso, 
1996).  
 
Cohesive subgroup membership can be seen as one of the strongest forms of 
embeddedness and social capital. Individuals who form cohesive cliques directly 
influence each other, resulting in homogeneity in attitudes, behavior and beliefs 
(Friedkin, 1984: 417; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). When actors have relatively 
frequent contact (face-to-face) and when they are linked through intermediaries 
(Friedkin, 1984), greater homogeneity is expected. 
 
Cohesive subgroups 
In the conceptualization of cohesive subgroups, there are four general properties that 
apply: the mutuality of ties, the closeness or reachability of subgroup members, the 
frequency of ties among members, the relative frequency of ties among subgroup 
members compared to non-members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Specifically, the 
number of ties an individual has to the group and the closeness of the entire group to 
outsiders matters (Collins, 1988; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Cohesive subgroup 
members have more numerous or more intense relations with each other than non-  6
cohesive subgroup actors. Cohesive subgroups are generally characterized by highly 
cohesive subsets of similar actors in a network (Knoke and Kuklinsky, 1992). Social 
forces operate through direct and indirect contacts among subgroup members and 
through the cohesion within the subgroup as compared to outside (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994).  
 
Enabling social capital: From loosely coupled alliance networks to the formation 
of cohesive subgroups  
Since trust is an important basis for knowledge sharing and partner selection, firms 
tend to be locally-biased in their search strategies (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Stuart and Podolny, 2000). They often engage in “local 
search” in their subsequent ties. They tend to initiate new partnerships that share the 
context with the outcomes of prior searches.
1 In their technological positioning, firms 
also search for those technologies that enable them to extend their established 
technological capabilities (Stuart and Podolny, 1996). They generally search for 
partners with whom they share technological content and with whom they are either 
directly or indirectly linked to in the technological network. These preferential 
relations are path-dependent as prior ties determine the formation of future linkages 
(e.g. Gulati, 1995; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; 
Tsai, 2000). Furthermore, these ties ameliorate information sharing, reduce resistance 
and provide comfort amongst the partners.  
 
Because of the lack of information about the competencies and reliabilities of 
potential partners, developing a relation with a new actor involves uncertainty (Tsai, 
2000). Because firms invest a substantial amount of time and energy to establish these 
strong relationships (Burt, 1992), changing transaction partners in the short run is not 
likely, since it involves significant switching costs and implies a risk that existing 
relationships will dissolve. Therefore, changing transaction partners in the short run, 
involves significant switching costs at the risk that existing relationships will dissolve 
(Chung, Sing and Lee, 2000). As actors develop ‘specific routines for managing an 
interface with each other’ (Gulati, 1995: 626), they tend to become blind for new 
                                                 
1 This concept of local search was raised by Stuart and Podolny (1996), were local search concerns 
initiating new R&D projects that have common technological content regarding outcome of their prior 
searches.   7
partnership opportunities and instead rely on previous partners and routines only 
(Tsai, 2000). Thus, when trustworthy partners are readily available, searching for, or 
switching to, new partners is hard to rationalize in the alliance formation process 
(Chung, Sing and Lee, 2000). Therefore actors rather replicate their existing ties 
(Gulati, 1995, 1998; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997) through local search and hence 
look for partners they are familiar with and with whom they share similarities in 
technological content in their densely connected social system. In the past, several 
scholars have addressed the fact that social relations develop in a path-dependent way, 
in the sense that previous ties determine how the future relationships evolve (see e.g. 
Gulati, 1995; Levinthal and Finchman, 1988; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Tsai, 
2000). 
 
Another reason why firms tend to replicate their existing partnerships is the fear of 
loss of reputation. This fear deters firms in a web of relations from behaving 
opportunistically against each other and thus increases the stability and longevity of 
their alliance formation in their closed system. The likelihood that a firm acts 
unethically decreases when the firm is structurally as well as relationally embedded in 
a network of relations, since this behavior is communicated quickly to other partners 
in the network. Actors then update their evaluation of the opportunistic actor and may 
not trust or interact with that firm in the future, since the opportunistic actor violates 
against the trust created at the network level as well as on the dyadic level (Rowley, 
Behrens, Krackhardt, 2000). Since unethical behavior damages the reputation of the 
opportunistic firm, this becomes a critical issue in partner selection. These reputation 
effects prevent cohesive subgroup-members to behave unethically. However, it may 
be difficult for actors involved to maintain ethical norms regarding actors outside of 
their cohesive subgroups. The expression “honor among thieves” (Brass, Butterfield 
and Skaggs, 1998) may be the result of strong and dense connections among the 
thieves, who do not hesitate to act unethical to outsiders, i.e. non-cohesive subgroup 
members. Furthermore, cohesive subgroups may be more powerful in number and 
positions and therefore can afford to act unethically without fearing the consequences 
(Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998). 
 
Over time, partner attractiveness will remain high or becomes even stronger 
(Madhavan, Koka, Prescott, 1998) and preferential relations tend to develop into   8
strong ties, since there is frequent interaction and partners commit heavily to the 
relationship. Strong ties (Granovetter, 1973), are characterized by a solid, reciprocal 
and trustworthy relationship. This type of relationship creates a large basis of trust and 
intimacy between the partners (Brass, Butterfield, Skaggs, 1998; Granovetter, 1973). 
As those firms replicate these preferential relations based on their social capital at the 
group level (Lin, 1999) and embeddedness, we see cohesive subgroups emerge in this 
network, which becomes a growing repository of information on the availability, 
competencies, and reliability of prospective partners (Walker, Kogut, Shan, 1997; 
Gulati, 1995; Powell, Koput, Smith Doerr, 1996). 
 
In the first part, we addressed embeddedness and social capital that drive the alliance 
network formation process in general and the block formation process in particular 
(table 1). Especially, the social mechanisms of local search and replication of previous 
ties or preferential partnering behavior cause the network to evolve, as those 
mechanisms constitute the enabling effects of social capital. In the next section, we 
will address the paralyzing effects of social capital at the group level caused by 
constraining social mechanisms (figure 2) in the block formation process. 
Table 1 The alliance network formation process 
 Social capital is crucial in reproducing the alliance network over time. Being 
embedded in a densely connected network as a result of a high amount of social 
capital, makes engagement in subsequent ties more likely (Walker, Kogut and Shan, 
1997). Social capital at the group level (Lin, 1999) in particular, is crucial in the 
process of cohesive subgroup formation as the network becomes more dense. When 
the size of the network grows and hence the density of the network increases as the 
Alliance network formation  Cohesive subgroup formation 
why do firms 
create ties? 
with whom do 



























   9
actors engage in multiple relationships, the possibility that alliance cohesive 
subgroups are formed, increases. The latter results from actors who develop strong, 
densely connected and cohesive ties through local search. Since current alliance 
networks provide future alliance opportunities (Gulati, 1995), early participation may 
provide firms with potentially valuable partnering possibilities for the future. Alliance 
proactive firms in networks are therefore more likely to possess the specific 
knowledge related to the identification and the selection of appropriate alliance 
partners (Sarkar, Echambadi, Harrison, 2001). Alliance pro-activeness is a first mover 
advantage, as early mover firms tend to capture advantageous positions resulting from 
their partner choice. Thus, pre-emption of valuable and scarce resources in partner 
space can be a source of strategic advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Harrison, 2001). As a result, certain partners are not available, because 
they are already tied to the focal firm’s competitors. Thus, if the size of the network 
increases, cohesive subgroup formation is more likely. 
 
P1: If the size of the network increases, cohesive subgroup formation is more likely 
 
Constraining social capital at the group level: Overembeddedness as a result of 
similarity and relational inertia 
As discussed above, the decision with whom to partner is influenced by the network 
of past partnerships (Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999) and depends on the embedded relations 
the firm is already engaged in (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998). Resulting from this 
repeated alliance 
formation caused by local 
search, frequent 
interaction and increased 
commitment in the 
relationship, trust and 
intimacy have grown 
strong between the 
partners (Granovetter, 
1973; Brass, Butterfield 
and Skaggs, 1998). As partners have become more familiar with each other, because 

























Figure 2 Social mechanisms  10
Gulati, 1995), greater homogeneity is expected than when they have less contact 
(Friedkin, 1984). “The more tightly that individuals are tied into network, the more 
they are affected by group standards (Collins, 1988: 416)”
2. Social contagion shows 
up when individuals take up the attitudes or behavior of others who influence them 
(Bovasso, 1996) Social contagion is both an individual and a group phenomenon 
(Burt, 1992; Bovasso, 1996). The cohesion approach therefore suggests that similarity 
in attitudes stems from the proximity between actors, implying that directly linked 
actors will be more similar and homogeneous than indirectly linked individuals 
(Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998). This holds especially for actors that are 
connected by strong ties rather than weak ties (Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998).  
 
Similarity Actors that are densily connected and who maintain strong ties among 
themselves, like in cohesive subgroups, are more likely to act similarly, to share 
information, to develop similar preferences, or to act in concert (Knoke and 
Kuklinsky, 1992). Thus, similarity can induce interaction, or can be the cause of 
attraction. Scholars refer to this process as “similarity breeds attraction” and 
“interaction breeds similarity” (Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998). These processes 
increase a firms’ tendency to replicate their existing ties. In similar vein, social 
identity theory (Gómez, Kirkman, Shapiro, 2000) states that similarity strengthens 
self-image as actors are attracted to similar others. Furthermore, actors treat those 
similar others -e.g. group members- more favourably than others (Gómez, Kirkman, 
Shapiro, 2000).  
 
From a technology point of view, we expect that firms need to have some pre-alliance 
technological overlap (see e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Hamel, 1991; Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1988; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996) to absorb their partners 
technological capabilities (Tsai, 2001). Thus, some technological similarity in their 
technology portfolio is required for the replication of the actors’ ties. The extent to 
which these firms are able to learn from their partners depends on their intent. We 
expect that if actors intend to internalise their partners’ technological capabilities 
(Hamel, 1991), instead of only accessing them, their post-alliance technological 
                                                 
2 In: Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 1994, p.250   11
profiles will be converging and will become more similar (Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman, 1996).  
    
P2: As firms replicate their existing ties, their technology profiles become similar  
 
Relational inertia   The familiarity and strong ties that have been built up through the 
replication of ties and the increasing similarity of firms within the cohesive 
subgroups, can lead to constraints in partner choice when facing opportunities for 
linking up with actors of another strategic block. Once firms have established links in 
a specific block, the formation of ties outside that block can be difficult, because of 
the possible conflict of interest among its partners (Nohria, Garcia-Pont, 1991). This 
implies that some actors in blocks are locked in as a result of initial alliance choices 
and actors outside the block are locked out in order to prevent knowledge leakage to 
competing groups. Another reason for locking out actors of other groups is the 
implicit expectation of loyalty to group members, since many alliances preclude the 
parties from allying with firms from competing groups (Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 
2000). As a result, certain partners are not available, because they are already tied to 
the focal firm’s competitors.  
 
Actors have limits to the resources they can devote to the search process for new 
partners. These resource constraints imply that ties with one actor place constraints on 
ties with others (Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000). Therefore, some potential partners are 
simply excluded in the partner selection phase. This phenomenon of strategic gridlock 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996) forces firms to engage in local search for partners within its 
own strategic block (see figure 2). This relational inertia makes group members rigid 
and cognitively locked-in (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). This cognitive 
lock-in effect filters the information and perspectives that reach the group members 
and isolates them from actors outside of the group. In this state of rigidity and 
overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997) caused by similar actors and relational inertia, 
cohesive subgroup members suffer from decreasing opportunities for learning and 
innovation. This state of overembeddedness is likely to put a severe strain on their 
ability to move flexible into other “resource niches” or into new windows of 
opportunities. 
   12
P3: When looking for new partners, firms replicate their existing ties within the  
subgroup through local search 
 
DATA  
The data on strategic alliances and characteristics of companies involved in these 
alliances is derived from the MERIT-CATI databank on strategic technology 
alliances. The database covers the period between 1970 and 1996 and contains 
information on nearly 13000 alliances of parent companies active in biotechnology, 
information technology, new materials technology and “non-core” technologies. The 
most important data sources are international and specialized trade and technology 
journals for each sector of industry and many fields of technology. From the primary 
modes of cooperation presented in this database like joint-ventures and research 
corporations, joint R&D agreements, technology exchange agreements, direct 
investment, customer-supplier relations and one directional technology flows, we 
chose two-directional technology flows.  
 
Sample 
In this paper, we study strategic technology alliances in the microelectronics industry. 
We will test our hypotheses by examining alliance network formation in the 
microelectronics industry from 1970-2000 (figure 3). Strategic technology alliances 
are defined as the establishment of common interests between independent (industrial) 
partners that are not connected through (majority) ownership. The transfer of 
technology or the undertaking of joint research has to be part of the arrangement. 
Mere production or marketing alliances are excluded. Examples of strategic 
























































Figure 3 Number of alliances formed in microelectronics 1970-2000   13
agreements, R&D contracts, (mutual) second sourcing, cross-licensing, research 
corporations, agreements and joint ventures with technology sharing or R&D 
programmes and cross-holdings. For the purpose of the present analysis, information 
was used regarding the industrial sectors in which companies operate, their core 
business, the year of establishment of the strategic technology alliance and the 
industry affiliation of the alliance. 
 
Our sample was drawn from an update of the CATI database, which covered the 
period 1970-2000. In the IT sector, i.e. computers, industrial automation, 
microelectronics, software and telecom, 5745 collaborative agreements were formed 
in this period (table 2). The strategic technology alliances in microelectronics count 
for 1047 alliances in this period. This sector comprises semiconductors: i.e. 
processors, accelerator chips, RISC-processors, memory chips, ASIC’s, expansion 
and other chip boards and transistors. 
Table 2 Sample drawn from CATI database 
 
For measuring our hypotheses we computed several social network measures by 
constructing adjacency matrices representing the relationships between the firms in 
the strategic technology alliance network. Various network measures like degree 
centrality and network density were calculated using UCINET 5 (Borgatti, Everett 
and Freeman, 1992). Furthermore we used software from the Centre for Global 
Corporate Positioning (CGCP) to plot the network graphs. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper can be seen as one of the first empirical attempts to study the process of 
cohesive subgroup formation from a longitudinal perspective. In order to shed more 
light on these subgroup formation processes we investigated the social mechanisms 
that enable and enforce cohesive subgroup formation over time. Our main argument is 
Number of collaborative 
agreements in IT  1970-2000 
Number of strategic technology 
alliances IT 1970-2000 
Number of strategic technology 
alliances in microelectronics 
1970-2000 
5745 3905 1047 
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that social capital in first instance can be seen as an enabling factor for cohesive 
subgroup formation. Over time, however, the enabling effect of social capital can turn 
into a paralyzing effect which locks-in partners in their closed social system, thereby 
reducing these organisation’s flexibility and innovative strength. We tested our main 
hypotheses by an empirical analysis of cohesive subgroup formation patterns in the 
microelectronics industry from 1970 to 2000. 
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